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1. Introduction
One of the main changes that the “knowledge-based” economy has brought to international 
competition  and  to  companies’  behaviour  regards  the  importance  that  intellectual  assets, 
rather than physical assets, have for the competitive advantage of regions and companies. 
Patents, scientific and technological knowledge in general and human skills are all factors that 
play a key role in defining firms’ profitability and firms’ capability to defend their market 
position. Against this background, the worldwide growing demand for technologies expressed 
by large and small firms and by other  institutions  represents  a  remarkable  feature.  This 
process has promoted the setting-up of a variety of solutions for the exchange of technologies 
and  technological  knowledge  (e.g.  joint-ventures,  partnerships,  licensing,  cross-licensing, 
R&D contracts), and brought to the upsurge and functioning of “markets for technology”. The 
recent evolution of the competitive environment shows that technology trade has undoubtedly 
become a relevant aspect of the “knowledge-based economy”.
Firms are gradually changing their strategies in order to take advantage of the possibility of 
technology outsourcing, on the one hand, and in order to increase the gains from their R&D 
activity, by licensing the internally developed technologies to other firms and institutions, on 
the other. This pattern gave rise to the view that competitive strengths are shifting from 
technological  aspects  to  different  levels  of  competitive  behaviour.  Instead  of  keeping 
technology secret and using it as a distinctive competence, companies have relatively greater 
advantages in licensing out their technologies, according to some well defined technology 
strategy. Indeed, the development and functioning of specialised “markets for technologies” 
represents a further option for companies, which can think at licensing out their technologies 
as an alternative, viable solution to acquire rents. At the same time, companies’ decision to 
enter new (technological) markets and to diversify from existing technologies, can be pursued 
“buying” new technologies directly from the market, at competitive prices. Companies can 
take advantage of the economies (of specialisation) that can be generated at the industry level. 
They can exploit more efficient production processes, with advantages in terms of enhanced 
productivity of downstream investments in their own businesses.
This study analyses determinants and implications of technology trading strategies promoted 
by large firms. Specifically, it considers the case of large chemical companies and explores 
the example of one of those companies (Himont), which more than others based its success on 
technology licensing. This example tries to answer a key question related to technology 
strategies: Why do (large) firms license out their technologies? It is well known that licensing 
represents one of the possible means that companies can exploit to capture value from their 
innovative activity. The possibility to pursue this strategy depends on the existence of a set of 
conditions, among which Teece (1986 and 1998) has identified the appropriability regimes, 
the dominant design paradigm, and the presence of complementary assets. These conditions 
are not easily satisfied. However, more and more companies in the industrialised countries are 
thinking at licensing out of their unutilised technological portfolio (patents) as a mean to gain 
financial or economic benefits.
A recent survey conducted on 133 firms and 20 universities from Western Europe, North 
America and Japan operating in different industrial sectors, shows that nearly two-thirds of 
organisations have a share of unutilised patents, and one in eight have in excess of 1,000 
patents (BTG, 1998). At the same time, most of them find licensing out attractive, primarily 
because  of  financial,  economic  or  commercial  benefits.  Indeed,  about  two-thirds  of 
organisations reported to license technologies to other organisations. In turn, this implies that 3
the  management  of  technological  knowledge  and  other  intellectual  property  rights  is 
becoming a “core competence” of successful enterprises. This is because, the strategic use of 
patents,  technologies  and  other  intellectual  property  right  can  enhance  the  success  of  a 
company in three different ways: a) by stacking out and defending a proprietary market 
advantage;  b)  by  improving  firms’  financial  performance  (realising  the  “hidden value of 
patents”); and, c) by increasing firms’ competitiveness (Rivette and Kline, 2000). The critical 
point  of  this  approach  is  that,  once  developed,  a  technology  becomes  a  sunk  cost  and 
companies can leverage such a cost as a source of revenues and R&D funding. In these cases, 
however, in order to avoid an increase in competition in the final product market where the 
company  is  currently  operating,  licensing  is  usually  confined  to  old  technologies,  to 
geographically separated markets, or to non-core technologies resulting from processes of 
technological diversification (Granstrand et al., 1997; Patel and Pavitt, 1997).
If  these  are  the  possible  advantages  coming  out  from  licensing, the question then shifts 
towards  under  which  conditions  licensing  out  the latest  technology  becomes  an  optimal 
strategy. Different explanations can be considered. Arora and Fosfuri (1999), demonstrate that 
large incumbent firms are willing to license out their technologies to other firms potentially 
competing with them in the final product market, because of the expected revenues from 
licensing. Indeed, in some circumstances, the amount of those revenues is greater than the 
erosion of profits due to other firms competing in the downstream product market – the 
“revenue effect” is greater than the “rent dissipation effect” –, so that licensing out represents 
a convenient strategy. This usually happens in the presence of existing technology suppliers 
providing technologies to potential entrants and thus creating new competitors in the product 
market and increasing the rent dissipation effect.
In general terms, Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2000) suggest that the decision on whether 
licensing or exploiting the technology in-house depends on three main factors. First, if the 
firm has distinctive complementary assets in production and marketing, compared to other 
competing firms, the efficient strategy is in-house exploitation of technology. On the contrary, 
licensing might become the right strategy, in order to acquire some rents from innovation. 
Second, the decision also depends on the nature and importance of the transaction costs 
involved  in  the  exchange  of  complementary  assets,  compared  with  the  importance  of 
transaction costs involved in selling or licensing the technology. If the latter are greater than 
the former, a company without the needed complementary assets may choose to acquire those 
assets in the specialised market, and then exploit the technology in-house.  This  strategy 
allows firms to save resources, compared with the strategy of licensing, because of the smaller 
amount  of  transaction  costs.  Finally,  firms  may  choose  to  license  their  proprietary 
technologies instead of exploiting them in-house, because of the extent of competition in the 
final  product  market.  The  degree  of  competition  influences  the  capability  for  firms  of 
extracting returns, so that the “best strategy” is to operate in the market (technology vs. 
product market) with the smaller level of competition.
The case of Himont highlights many of these points and gives a partial answer to the previous 
theoretical  models.  The  sparking  condition  for  licensing  was  the  presence  of  financial 
problems which prevented Himont from using its new process technology for polypropylene 
(PP) production. As suggested by Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, without the downstream 
complementary assets in production, licensing out became the optimal answer in order gain 
profits from R&D investments, and indeed Himont acted at the beginning as an external 
technology  supplier.  Later,  other  conditions  came  into  play  and  strengthened  Himont’s 
decision to license. First, the presence of other technology suppliers that were creating new 4
competitors in the downstream PP market where Himont was operating. Coherently with 
Arora and Fosfuri’s model, this increased the rent dissipation effect. Second, the demand of 
plastics (and particularly PP) constantly grew during the 1980s and 1990s, thus leaving space 
for new firms to serve the market. In turn, this lowered the degree of competition induced 
from the new suppliers of PP operating with the process technology licensed from Himont 
itself. Third, as suggested by the model of Khazam and Mowery (1993), Himont aimed at 
creating a standard of PP in the product market, and this was possible only licensing widely 
its process technology. Indeed, companies acquiring polypropylene were used to have two to 
three suppliers, and they were better off if both were using the same technology for making 
PP. In turn, the presence of many suppliers using the same Himont’s technology strengthened 
the linkage between Himont and its customers (in the product market).
At the same time, the case of Himont has implications for antitrust policy as well. When 
Montedison  decided  to  merge Himont with Shell, both the European and US regulatory 
authorities  opposed  to  this  decision  because  it  was  going  to  create  (and  strengthen)  a 
monopoly in the market for process technology. At the best of our knowledge, this was the 
first case in which problems of monopoly power came not in the market for products – and 
hence directly linked to customers well-being –, but in the market for technology. And, even 
more interesting, was the solution that the authorities identified in order to solve to problem.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 represents an introduction to 
the issue of technology transfer in chemicals, and offers an empirical assessment of the 
diffusion of technology licensing in this sector, by highlighting both the role of Specialised 
Engineering  Firms  and  of  large  chemical  companies.  Section  3  discusses  the  origins  of 
licensing practices in chemicals, by describing the conditions of the knowledge base and of 
the  demand  for  chemical  products.  Section  4  focuses  on  the  case  of  Himont.  It  firstly 
describes the main facts of Himont’s life, by explaining which “historical accidents” brought 
Himont to license its proprietary technology. Then, it explores the aspects of the licensing 
strategy, licensing management and the implication for antitrust policy. Section 5 concludes.
2. Diffusion of technology licensing in the chemical industry
The example of Himont and its licensing activity is not an isolated case in the chemical 
industry. For reasons that will be discussed in section 3, the existence of a set of conditions in 
the  cognitive  space,  the  solution  of  transactional  problems,  and  the  growing  demand  of 
chemical compounds since the Second World War shaped the industry structure and allowed 
a worldwide division of labour between technology suppliers and chemical companies. The 
exchange  of  process  and  product  technologies  was  mostly  carried  out  through  licensing 
agreements.  The  main  actors  in  the  chemical  market  for  technologies  were  firstly  the 
Specialised  Engineering  Firms  (SEFs),  although  large  chemical  companies  were  largely 
involved in licensing their proprietary technologies.
Before discussing the reasons that pushed large companies to pursue these strategies, and 
deepening our understanding with the analysis of the Himont case, it is useful to provide some 
general empirical evidence of technology exchange in chemicals. Thus, the objective of this 
section  is  to  describe  the  market  for  technologies  in  greater  detail,  both  by  comparing 5
different means for transferring technological knowledge, and by taking into consideration 
country characteristics.
1
As far as the regional distribution of licensing agreements is concerned, table 1 considered 
5,442 licenses that were exchanged in the US, Europe, Japan and Germany. Data are drawn 
from the Chem-Intell database.
2 Four different types of technology suppliers were considered:
a) top chemical companies – those ranking in the top 50 positions in terms of number of 
plants owned and reported in the dataset;
b) other chemical companies – those owning more than 5 plants, but not top companies;
c) Specislised Engineering Firms;
d) staff – the case in which firms developed internally the process technologies used in 
their plants.
Table 1 shows that SEFs are the most important source of chemical processes technologies in 
all the developed countries. They own 50.9% of the total market for technology. Half of the 
transactions are in the US (23.3%), followed by in-house technology development (16.3%). 
However, when one considers the frequencies of SEFs transactions and in-house technology 
development conditional upon each receiving country, these shares are very similar. In all the 
four regions, about 50% of the technologies are supplied by the SEFs, and 40% by the 
companies’ staff. This suggests that, apart from using its own technology expertise, chemical 
companies often rely on the specialised suppliers of process technologies.
Table 1 – Shares of licensing agreements by type of licensor and region (1980-1997)
Receiving Country
Licensor Germany UK Japan US Total
Top Chem. Companies* 1.7 1.4 2.7 3.7 9.5
Other Chem. Companies* 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8
SEFs 8.9 8.3 10.4 23.3 50.9
Staff 7.4 5.6 9.5 16.3 38.8
Total 18.1 15.5 22.8 43.6 100.0
*Top Chem. Companies: Companies in the top 50 positions in terms of number of plants; Other Chem. 
Companies: Companies with more than 5 plants, excluded the top 50 companies.
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998.
This phenomenon is further analysed in table 2, which considers the type of companies 
involved in the vertical linkages. The analysis confirms that SEFs are the principal suppliers 
of technologies in the chemical sector – they cover the 68.2% of the total market for licensing. 
This is true for all types of companies with at least one chemical plant. The SEFs license 
almost 50% of the technologies used by the top chemical firms, 70% of the technological 
know-how used by the companies with at least 5 chemical plants, and 80% of the technology 
used by the companies with less than 5 plants. The top chemical companies have the lowest 
share  of  technology  received  from  the  SEFs,  clearly  due  to  their  higher  technological 
capabilities  developed  in-house.  This  is  confirmed  by  table  2.  Not  only  top  chemical 
companies develop by themselves almost half of their technological know-how, but they also 
sell these technologies to other chemical companies.
                                                
1 An extensive analysis on this issue can be found in Cesaroni and Mariani (2001).
2 The Chem-Intell database collects information on 36,343 plants built world-wide since 1980. For each plant, a 
number of detailed information are present: kind of production realised, production capacity, technology used, 
owner of the plant, contractor which provided the engineering services, licensor, construction year, and so on.6
Table 2 – Shares of licensing agreements by type of licensor and licensee (1980-1997)
Receiving Company







Top Chem. Companies* 1.6 6.9 2.7 11.2
Other Chem. Companies* 0.2 0.9 0.4 1.5
SEFs 9.3 39.8 19.1 68.2
Staff 8.6 8.8 1.7 19.1
Total 19.7 56.4 23.9 100.0
*Top Chem. Companies: Companies in the top 50 positions in terms of number of plants; Other Chem. 
Companies: Companies with more than 5 plants, excluded the top 50 companies; “Non”  Chem. 
Companies: Companies with 5 or less than 5 plants.
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998.
The role of SEFs in licensing is further analysed in table 3. Although the SEFs started as an 
American phenomenon, table 3 shows that other countries are now successfully competing 
with the US in this field, particularly in Europe and the third-world markets. However, while 
the US SEFs have a sizable share of the European market, the European SEFs have only a 
small share of the US market. In particular, table 3 shows that the market share of US SEFs in 
licensing is about 15%, followed by West Germany with a share of 8.8%. However, if one 
looks at the share of US licenses in Europe and Japan with respect to the correspondent shares 
of her competitors, the comparative advantage of US SEFs in licensing is even more apparent.




USA West Europe Japan Rest of the 
World
Share of Total 
World Market
USA  18.0 10.3 6.5 16.9 15.1
West Germany 3.1 11.3 1.0 10.2 8.8
UK 1.2 3.0 2.7 1.4 2.4
Italy 0.1 1.4 0.0 2.2 1.6
France 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.7
Japan 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.1 0.7
Source: Chemical Age Profile (Arora and Gambardella, 1998).
Finally, in table 4 an estimation of the “value” of the licensing market in chemicals during the 
period 1990-1997 is shown. Information have been drawn from the SDC database.
3
The values reported in table 4 have been calculated as follows. We first considered the whole 
SDC database (52,000 transactions), and selected the licensing agreements that disclosed the 
unit value. We then attributed each license to one of the 5 industrial sectors shown in table 4. 
For each of these 5 sectors we computed the average value of a license (first column on the 
                                                
3 The SDC database (Securities Data Company, 1998) and Chem-Intell (1998). The SDC database typically 
reports product licenses. The database is constructed from SEC filings (10-Qs), financial journals, news wire 
services, proxies and quarterly reports. There are information on about 52,000 inter-firm agreements world-wide 
in all sectors. For each transaction there are information on the type of agreement (i.e. license, joint R&D, joint 
manufacturing, etc.), whether the agreement involves a technology transfer, the number of partners involved, the 
sector, the country and the region of the transaction. Data are available from 1990 to 1997.7
left).
4 We then calculated the number of licenses by sector and, based on the estimated mean 
value per license, we computed the total amount of money involved in the exchange of 
knowledge in the 5 sectors (first column on the right).
Table 4 – Value and number of licenses by sector (Millions of dollars, 1990-1997)
Estimated Value 
per License
Nr. of Licenses Total Value per 
Sector
General Chemicals 104.2 248 25,835.4
Pharmaceuticals 117.4 1,394 163,606.7
Soaps & Cosmetics 3.0 29 87.0
Rubber & Plastics 3.0 41 123.0
Petroleum Refining 6.2 33 203.2
Average  46.7 349 16,298.3
Source: SDC, 1998.
Table  4  shows  that  the  pharmaceutical  sector  reports  the  highest  number  of  licensing 
agreements and the highest value per alliance, and hence moves the largest amount of money. 
By contrast, in the general chemical sector, licensing agreements tend to be less numerous, 
although the unit value is rather high. The market for knowledge seems to be relatively less 
developed in soaps and cosmetics, rubber and plastics and petroleum refining, where both the 
number and the unit value of agreements are low compared to the other sectors in table 4.
2.1 The changing strategic aptitude of large chemical companies
The empirical evidence reported in the previous section highlighted the active role of both 
SEFs  and  large  chemical  companies  in  licensing  their  process  technologies.  While  the 
behaviour of SEFs has been the result of an increasing division of labour at the industry level, 
the presence of large companies in the market for technologies is rather a recent event. To be 
sure, few of them have been active technology licensors for a long time – especially is some 
branches of the chemical industry, like in polyolefins, and particularly in polyethylene (PE) 
and  polypropylene  (PP).  Union  Carbide  and  Exxon  Chemical,  with  their  Univation 
Technologies joint venture, Montell, Nova and Borealis are some of these examples. Indeed, 
forty to fifty percent of new PE capacity is built using technology licensed from third parties 
(Chemical Week, 1997b).
The interesting point, however, is that more and more chemical companies, also operating in 
sub-markets  different  from  polyolefins,  are  approaching  this  new  strategy,  and  licensing 
process technology is rapidly emerging as one of the most popular growth strategies in the 
chemical industry. The examples of Dow, Monsanto, and DuPont, traditionally reluctant to 
license their proprietary know-how, are rethinking their strategies and are representative of 
this new strategic approach.
Dow Chemical began its licensing activity in 1995, evaluating all of its 120 manufacturing 
processes for licensing potential, mainly aiming at contrasting rising R&D costs with a new 
revenue source. It also recognized the success of such long-time process licensers as Union 
                                                
4 In two cases –  i.e. soap and cosmetics, and rubber and plastics – we had too few observations (less than 5 licenses). Thus, 
instead of calculating the mean value, we considered the median value of the whole sample of alliances.8
Carbide and BP Chemicals, and the potential of licensing revenues to be less cyclical than 
commodity  businesses.  Further,  Dow  saw  opportunities  to  acquire  new  technologies  by 
licensing know-how from other companies. The key of this new strategy was an extensive 
inventory of Dow’s existing portfolio to determine what technologies could be of value to 
other companies and what technologies Dow needed to acquire. This task was promoted by a 
newly formed licensing group, which also worked closely with Dow’s business groups to 
ensure that potential licensing revenues for each of the processes would exceed a business 
group’s potential loss of monopoly technology position. In the moment in which the licensing 
group was formed, Dow’s goal was to have a portfolio of a half-dozen technologies to be 
repeatedly licensed, so as to increase its licensing revenues from $10-20 million/year, to $100 
million/year by 2000 (Chemical Week, 1997a).
A similar path was covered by DuPont Specialty Chemicals, which formed in 1998 a group 
to license its process technologies, including acrylonitrile, aniline, sulfuric acid, and a range 
of performance chemicals processes, with the aim of generating $10 million/year in licensing 
revenues and add 10 licensees/year to its existing listing of about 50. The creation of the new 
group was the result of a changing behaviour towards technology licensing. In the past, 
indeed, DuPont carried out licensing only reactively, while the objective of the new group 
was to open up DuPont’s 25 specialty chemicals businesses to licensing, some of which have 
been available for license for the first time. Indeed, DuPont observed an increasing interest in 
its  acrylo  process,  especially  from  Midddle  East  and  Asian  producers,  where  only  two 
technology suppliers were operating. The new licensing group coordinated its activities with 
the Corporate Technology Transfer Group, which was formed in 1994 to oversee all tech
transfer activities (Chemical Week, 1998b).
Similarly,  Eastman  Chemical  established  in  1998  a  technology  licensing  unit,  called 
Eastman Global Technology Ventures, in order to sell its under-utilised intellectual property 
portfolio. Indeed, in the view of the company this choice offers potential for non capital-
intensive growth and near-term returns. Hence, the company started assessing its portfolio for 
possible products (Chemical Week, 1998a). 
What is behind this increasing interest towards technology licensing shown by the largest 
chemical producers? The first simple answer is that by both licensing and selling products 
made by using the same technologies firms can increase the financial return from R&D 
investments, especially when companies have a share of under-utilised technology assets 
available for licensing. In this sense, licensing becomes an important growth mechanism for 
firms. Furthermore, the examples of BP Chemicals and Union Carbide, which have been 
long-time  successful  process  technology  licensors,  may  have  persuaded  more  and  more 
companies  to  license,  attracted  by  the  prospects  of  creating  more  value  from  existing 
technologies.
5
Licensing, however, implies certain risks, mainly because the licensees can become potential  
future competitors in the final product market. In order to avoid this risk, companies usually 
                                                
5 In 1997, Union Carbide and Exxon Chemical have set up a joint venture to  sell technology for producing 
polyethylene (PE). The new joint venture company, Univation Technologies, started licensing Carbide’s Unipol
gas-phase process and Exxon's metallocene technology. In the PE licensing business, it held a leading position 
with roughly 50% of the market (Chemical Week, 1997b). One of the objective of the joint-venture was to offer 
cutting edge processes and supply catalysts used in the manufacturing of PE for the Asia Pacific region. The 
joint venture targeted at the Asia-Pacific region because consumption of all types of PE was projected to grow 7-
9% annually till 2000. Indeed, at that time, Asian demand for PE was comparable to North America’s and 
surpassed  Western Europe’s (Business Times Singapore, 1997).9
adopt two different solutions. On the one hand, they select for licensing those technologies 
that  are  not  critical  for  them.  On  the  other,  they  keep  in-house  processes  which  are a 
technological step ahead of those licensed. Hence, while they are licensing some process 
technologies, they are working on the next generation of technology for internal production 
needs.  For  example,  Monsanto  and  Nova  behaved  in  such  ways,  respectively  (Chemical 
Week, 1997b).
It is interesting to note, however, that these two solutions represent only one possible mean to 
avoid or reduce the risks involved in licensing, and can be considered traditional answers. On 
the contrary, under certain conditions, licensing out the latest (or the “best”) technology 
becomes the optimal strategic choice as well. The case of Himont which will be discussed in 
the next sections is one of such examples. The presence of a product demand constantly 
increasing, the need to set up a standard in the process technology market, and the presence of 
already  existing  technology  suppliers  in  the  same  market  pushed  Himont  to  license  out 
aggressively its proprietary technologies.
3. Why is licensing so diffused in chemicals?
6
The empirical evidence reported in the previous section highlights how diffused are market-
based interactions for the exchange of process technologies in chemicals. The willingness of 
companies to pursue a strategy of active technology licensing has surely increased the size of 
the market for technology. However, in many cases, the decision to begin licensing has been 
either a reaction to competitors (or SEFs) already licensing their processes, or an attempt to 
reduce R&D investments and technology development costs by imitating the behaviour of 
long-term successful licensors. Their actions represented only an incremental effect on a 
market already existing and functioning. Hence, the existence of the market for technology in 
chemicals has to stand upon conditions that are different from firms’ choices, and that can be 
considered as pre-existing necessary conditions. Among these, it is possible to consider two 
aspects:
a) the knowledge base from which innovations are developed, which is generic to several 
applications, and can abstract from specific contexts;
b) the existence of self-reinforcing characteristics of the market for technology.
As far as the characteristics of the knowledge base are concerned, the developments in the 
scientific understanding in many chemical disciplines and the progress in the instrumentation 
have caused chemical research to move away from trial-and-error procedures to science-based 
approaches to industrial research. Scientific discoveries and general principles are the bases to 
“design” new products and processes.
This argument is related to the presence of tacit or codified knowledge in chemicals. In 
general terms, the more general and abstract is a piece of knowledge, the easier it is to 
transfer that knowledge to other people and organisations that might use it for different 
purposes. By contrast, as the context and firm specificity of knowledge increases, the more it is 
difficult and costly to transfer that knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). In turn, general 
and abstract knowledge can be more easily transferred, and this allows for a greater division 
of innovative labour, with some firms or institutions developing more general technologies 
and others using them for specific applications. This opens up different alternative modes for 
                                                
6 The discussion reported in this section is based on Cesaroni and Mariani (2000).10
organising the innovative process, and allows firms to pursue different strategies to get access 
to new technologies, from in-house development to “outsourcing” decisions.
In the case of the chemical sector, may conditions operating in the cognitive environment 
reduced the degree of tacit and context specific features of knowledge. The concept of the unit 
operation  developed  in  1915  and  the  related  emergence  of  chemical  engineering  as  an 
academic discipline, the growing importance of petrochemicals after the Second World War, 
and the increase in the scale and complexity of chemical plants related to the introduction of 
petrochemicals led to the rise of a new market for engineering and process design services for 
chemical  plants.  In  particular,  the  development  of  chemical  engineering  as  an  academic 
discipline made it easier to separate the process design from the details of the compound 
being product in the plants – chemical engineering is usually known as the “science of 
chemical  processes”.  In  turn,  the  codification  of  process  technologies  and  the  rise  of 
specialised technology suppliers led to a vertical division of labour in the chemical-processing 
sector. Process technology was made into a “commodity” that could be traded due to general-
purpose nature of the knowledge exchanged. Put differently, a market for process technology 
developed  because  the  technology  traded  was  nothing  else  than  general  and  abstract 
knowledge that could be applied to different applications and markets.
As  the  empirical  evidence  described  in  the  previous  section  has  shown,  this  market  for 
technological knowledge in the chemical sector was (and is) mainly operated by a large 
number  of  small  specialised  and  technology-based  firms,  the  SEFs,  which  has  been  an 
original and persistent feature of the American chemical industry. With a few exceptions, the 
SEFs did not develop radically new processes. They were good at moving down the learning 
curve  for  processes  invented  by  the  large  oil  and  chemical  companies.  And,  equally 
important, they acted as independent licensors on behalf of other firms’ technology.
It is also worth noting that the SEFs started as an American phenomenon.
7 This was because 
the large size of the market has been a crucial factor for the rise of SEFs (Freeman, 1968). By 
the end of World War II, the world demand of chemical products grew – especially of 
petrochemicals – and pushed companies to raise the scale of production. The large scale 
increased the size and complexity of the plants, so that companies often faced a technological 
capability constraint, and demanded the intervention of external engineering specialists. 
The  special  features  of  the  knowledge  base, and the consequent diffusion of specialised 
technology suppliers, were only the first condition that enhanced the diffusion of market-
based exchanges in chemicals. The competitive interaction between SEFs and incumbent 
chemical producers was the second. Indeed, the existence of the SEFs, whose business is to 
sell  process  technologies  and  to  appropriate  rents  from  innovations,  encouraged  other 
chemical and oil firms to license their own technologies for making profits out of them, in a 
way of inducing a self-reinforcing mechanism that allowed the market for technology in the 
chemicals to persist over time.
The  traditional  and  managerial  literature  (among  others,  see  Teece,  1988)  holds  that 
companies can gain value from their innovations mainly by exploiting them in-house. There 
are many reasons why technology licensing is considered an undesirable strategy. Apart from 
the existence of transaction costs problems, and of cognitive constraints, the main reason is 
that by licensing, firms create new competitors in the downstream product market, hence 
                                                
7 According to Freeman (1968), 50% of the total value of engineering contracts world-wide in 1960-66 were 
done by American SEFs.11
reducing their profits in the product market and dissipating rents. Many companies’ CEOs 
have  similar  concerns  regarding  technology  licensing  (Chemical  Week,  1997b).  In  other 
words, firms incur in the rent dissipation effect, which consists in the erosion of profits due to 
another firm competing in the downstream market. But licensing also provides revenues from 
the sale of technologies (the revenue effect), in the form of licensing payments. Hence, the 
question is under what conditions the revenue effect is greater than the rent dissipation effect, 
so that of inducing licensing (Arora and Fosfuri, 1999).
The answer to this question mainly depends on the degree of competition – whether the 
company is a monopolist or operates in a competitive market – that the company faces in the  
product market. In the case of the chemical industry, specialised technology licensors that 
lack the downstream complementary assets in production and commercialisation sell more 
licenses – in this case, the rent dissipation effect is zero. However, in the presence of such 
licensors, downstream producers may be induced to license their technologies as well. In fact, 
given that the licensing activity of others create new competitors in any case, and hence 
reduces the capability to gain profits in the product market, the downstream producers may 
well have incentives in competing in the market for technologies, by selling their proprietary 
technologies. This is what exactly happened in the chemical sector, and the case of Himont 
strongly support this argument.
The  SEFs  acted  as  independent  technology  suppliers,  by  selling  process  technologies  to 
potential entrants in the product markets, and in turn this behaviour induced downstream 
chemical companies to become technology suppliers as well. Moreover, licensing by rivals in 
the downstream markets increased the propensity of other chemical companies to license their 
proprietary technologies as well. In this sense, licensing strategies tend to strengthen over 
time (i.e., there are self-reinforcing mechanisms). As a matter of fact, once established, the 
market for technology tends to persist over time. Indeed, in the chemical sector the market for 
process technologies has been a constant feature over the last forty years. Even today, Arora 
and Fosfuri (2000), using data on worldwide technology licensing during the 1980s, find that 
in those sub-sectors where firms without downstream assets license more, large chemical 
producers themselves tend to license more.
4. Demand, standards and antitrust in the case of Himont
8
4.1 Background
The case of Himont is part of the story of the plastic materials and especially polypropylene 
(PP). Advances in polyethylene and polypropylene in the 1950s helped establish these useful 
plastics  as  universal  materials.  Although  ICI  and  DuPont  were  already  producing  high-
pressure polyethylene for applications such as electric wire insulation, Germany's Karl Ziegler 
isolated a low-pressure crystalline polyethylene that seemed promising. Ziegler had begun 
work  on  ethylene  polymerisation  in  the  1930s  at  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Institute  for  Coal 
Research (in East Germany), and then carried the work to completion on organometallic 
catalysis  of  polyethylene  at  the  Max  Planck  Institute  (in  West  Germany)  after  the  war. 
Hercules started up the first low-pressure crystalline polyethylene unit in the U.S. in 1957 
based  on  a  license  from  Ziegler's  patents;  Koppers  and  Union  Carbide  soon  followed 
(C&EN,1998).
                                                
8 Information on Himont have been drawn from a face-to-face interview with Mr. Roberto Rettani, who has been 
one of the company’s former CEO.12
Against this economic and technological background, Himont was created in 1983 as a joint-
venture between the Italian Montedison and the American chemical group Hercules, both 
with a share of 50%. The venture then had 2.5 billion lb of annual capacity and $750 million 
in sales. The reasons for the creation of the joint-venture lay in both the financial weakness 
and  the  technological  strength  of  Montedison.  Indeed,  in  that  period,  Montedison  had 
developed an innovative technology aimed at the polymerisation of polypropylene, called 
Sheripol, based on an improvement of the Ziegler-Natta stereospecific catalysis – Karl Ziegler 
and Giulio Natta shared the 1963 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for that discover.
9
The Spheripol  liquid-phase  process  had  enormous  advantages  compared  to  existing  (and 
traditional)  process  technologies  for  PP.  First,  the  stereospecific  feature  of  the  catalyst
allowed a greater performance of the production plant and a greater control over the physical 
structure of the polymer, which directly influenced its physical behaviour and properties. 
Second, the compactness of the catalyst. By definition, a gas-phase process is necessarily
larger than a liquid-phase process, because a fluid requires a smaller space to be stored and 
handled than a gas. In turn, third, the greater compactness of a gas-phase plant implied lower 
investments and plant development costs.
Furthermore, by using different types of catalysts – a second know-how of Montedison – it 
was  possible  to  obtain  different  types  of  polymers.  This  characteristic  induced  a  great 
flexibility to the plant, allowing the operator to define different types of PP to be used in 
different specific applications. For example, by changing the physical structure of the polymer 
it was possible to obtain a range of different products, from films for the food industry to gel 
membranes, from car bumpers to upholstery for the car industry, to fibres for fabric to be used 
in the textile industry. Simply by defining the right molecular structure of the polymer it was 
so possible to influence its physical properties (softness, flexibility, toughness or rigidity).
Although  Montedison  had  developed  and controlled this technology, at the beginning of 
1980s it suffered of a strong financial crisis. It had not the financial capability neither to 
promote  the  industrial  development  of  the  technology,  nor  to  build  new  plants,  nor  to 
reconverting its existing plants to the new technology. In such a situation, the alliance with 
Hercules was an optimal solution. Hercules, indeed, had already a diffuse presence in North 
America and also a quite large presence in the Far East, regions where Montedison had no 
presence at all. And the possibility to operate in a global market was key to effectively exploit 
the new technology. On the other hand, Hercules had plants using older technologies and was 
not investing in their development because was trying to diversify in different segments. In 
addition to the geographical complementarity, the strength of Hercules was in downstream 
markets, where it had a large market share in the production of PP fibres and films.
Because of these complementarities, Montedison and Hercules decided the creation of the 
joint-venture aiming at the production of PP by using the Spheripol process, and at the 
licensing of the same technology to third parties. During the first period, the new venture 
performed  quite  well,  also  by  taking  advantage  of  the  growth  of  the  market  of  plastic 
materials, which on the contrary suffered of a great crisis some years before. As a matter of 
                                                
9 When professor Giulio Natta, working at the Milan Polytechnic Institute and financed largely by the Italian 
chemical producer Montecatini, scribbled the note “Made polypropylene” in his diary on March 11th 1954, he 
probably did not suspect that he had laid the foundation for what was to become the world’s most versatile 
family of synthetic materials. In the four decades that followed, polyolefin process and catalyst technology made 
enormous advances. (This anecdote is quoted in the Montell web-site: http://www.montell.com).13
fact, in two-three years following the creation of the joint-venture, Himont was able to build 
all the planned plants, to reconvert all the existing plants of Hercules, to reconvert the existing 
plants of Montedison, mainly by using internal financial resources.
Obviously, the success of Himont due to the new technology stimulated the reaction of 
competing companies – among which Fina, Shell, Atochem, DSM in Europe; Shell, Exxon, 
Kodak, US Stell, Union Carbide in the US – which used different technologies. Many of them 
were primarily large diversified petrochemical companies, which controlled and optimised the 
product flow from the cracker to the final products, and which produced PP by using very 
different technologies. Among the set of competitors there was also Union Cabide – whose 
aggressive licensing strategy has been recalled in the first section – with its Unipol gas-phase 
technology.
In 1987, Himont’s sales exceeded $981 million and its annual capacity approached 3 billion 
lb (C&EN, 1998). In the same year, the partners decided to sell a 22% interest in Himont to 
the public (at the New York Stock Exchange), and later that year Hercules sold its remaining 
interest  to  Montedison.  By  1990,  Himont  reached  annual  sales  nearing  $2  billion  and 
polypropylene capacity of almost 4 billion lb. During the same year, Montedison decided to 
buy the outstanding public shares of Himont, so as to maintain the control over the 100% of 
the capital. Why this choice?
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is strictly linked with the economic, social and 
political situation of the Italian chemical industry in that period. The two Italian chemical 
giants (ENI and Montedison) had just merged in Enimont, but leaving Himont (and other few 
companies such as Ausimont) outside of the new company. However, when the former CEO 
of  Montedison,  Mr.  Gardini,  tried  to  acquire  the  control of the State-owned part of the 
company, his intention was to use Himont as possible “exchange currency” against the State. 
Corruption and bad political behaviour made the rest. Enimont was split up again into the two 
original companies (ENI and Montedison), the Ferruzzi family (owner of Montedison) left, 
and Montedison started its financial crisis.
In order to solve financial problems, Montedison was forced to sell Farmitalia Carlo Erba to 
Pharmacia, and at the same time it tried to find an agreement with Shell Chemical in order to 
sell Himont. Instead of a complete selling, the management of Himont tried to create a joint-
venture with Shell, where Montedison had at least a part of the control over the new company. 
In the view of Montedison’s management, the joint-venture had to be only a temporary 
solution, waiting for a restructuring of the company.
The agreement with Shell was a also a positive solution to the changes in the PP market. First, 
Shell  was  strong  in  northern  Europe  and  Australia,  which  complemented  Montedison in 
southern Europe, the US and the Far East. Shell also contributed feedstocks from its cracker 
in southern France. This would have made Montell the only fully global PP player. Second, 
the big customers (large car producers) were starting to reduce the number of PP suppliers 
and to establish closer links with a limited number of them. Shell, however, was used to pay 
few  attention  to  customers’  needs,  and  to  compete  mainly  on  lower  prices  (and  large 
quantities). Himont, on the contrary, because of its existing licensing strategy, was much 
more customer oriented, so that Shell was going to “learn” a new business model by merging 
with Himont. Furthermore, the agreement aimed at improving the technological knowledge of 
the two companies as well, especially with regards to catalyses in which both companies had 
relevant technological competencies.14
Figure 2 – PP and PE production capacities (1996)
Source: C&IM, 1996.
After two/three years of contracting, in 1995, Montedison merged Himont into a joint venture
with Shell Chemical's polypropylene business to form Montell, creating a producer with more 
than $3 billion in annual sales and more than 7 billion lb of polypropylene capacity. One year 
later, in 1996, Shell worked out an agreement to buy out Montedison for $2 billion (C&EN, 
1998). At that period, Montell was the world’s largest producer of polypropylene by a huge 
margin, producing almost three times as much as its nearest competitor, Amoco (see figure 2). 
Its 21 PP sites, in 14 countries on five continents, were producing almost 3.1 Mt of the 
polymer every year. The company was formed with about 7,500 employees, including 800 in 
R&D and 750 in marketing (C&IM, 1996).
4.2 Motivations for technology licensing
One of the most interesting aspects of the story of Himont is that, during the different phases 
of its life, the company has never changed its licensing strategy, neither when the competitive 
environment, nor when PP market demand has changed. As it will be better explored in the 
following, one of the main reason of this choice was the fact that becoming technology leader 
was a valuable strategy also for customers. Indeed, when a technology standard stands out 
among others, the customer reduces the possible risks of second sourcing, and has a greater 
guarantee of product’s quality and availability. This happens indifferently when it buys from 
the technology leader or from its licensees.
As a matter of fact, Himont has been constantly active on technology licensing. Montedison 
started licensing before the formation of Himont. During the 1970s, it was collaborating with 
Mitsui (Japan) for improving the Ziegler-Natta catalysis. Then Mitsui developed a production 
process competing with Montedison’s Spheripol, but the research collaboration between the 
two companies continued in the field of catalysis. The beginning of the licensing activity by 
Montedison was primarily an historical accident. When developed, Montedison had not the 
financial capability to promote the industrialisation of the Spheripol process, and licensing 
was the only way to gain returns from R&D investments. This suggests that, because of the 
lack of downstream complementary assets in production, Montedison acted and thought at the 
beginning as a real technology supplier of today. Notice that the alternative viewpoint (i.e. if 15
markets for technology did not exist) was to not develop the technology, because Montedison 
could not exploit it internally by producing the product downstream 
Table 5 – Major PP producers by number of plants (1980-1997)
Rank Company N. of plants Rank Company N. of plants
1 Himont  14 11 China Techimport  5
2 Shell  12 12 Chisso  5
3 Amoco Chemicals  11 13 Mitsui Petrochemical 5
4 Hoechst  9 14 Montedison  5
5 Mobil 9 15 Repsol Quimica  5
6 Techmashimport  8 16 Solvay  5
7 BASF  6 17 Sumitomo  5
8 Exxon Chemical  6 18 DSM  4
9 Hercules  6 19 Huntsman Chemical  4
10 Borealis  5 20 Indian Petrochemicals  4
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998
But licensing was not so easy at that time, because the technology was not completely tested, 
and  the  only  existing  plant  using  the  new Spheripol  process  was  a  pilot  plant  built  by 
Montedison at Ferrara. Notice, however, that Montedison before, and Himont later, were 
mainly a manufacturing company. Their primarily business was selling chemical and plastic 
materials (e.g., PP and PE), and not technology licensing (see table 5). Hence, licensing was 
only a further way of increasing returns. Also note that because the company had experience 
in plant this probably meant that they developed the technology because they thought that 
they were going market the product in any case. In this sense, Montedison behaved probably 
different from today’s technology suppliers, which increasingly start by thinking that will 
eventually sell the technology and not the product.
In Himont’s decision of continuing the licensing activity of Montedison, three elements have 
been key: a) the increasing demand of PP all over the world during the 1980s and 1990s; b) 
the licensing activity of Himont’s competitors; and c) the desire of Himont of setting-up a 
global standard in PP materials. As far as the role of PP demand is concerned, one of the 
crucial  features  of  plastic  polyolefins  is  the  way  they  were  progressively  matching  and 
exceeding the performance of a growing number of other polymers and synthetic materials, 
because of their capability of adapting at different working conditions. This dramatic increase 
in versatility is reflected in the rapid penetration of this plastic materials. As a matter of fact, 
polypropylene demand has grown by an average of 9.7% a year over the last fifteen years (see 
figure 3).
In turn, the increase in PP demand has resulted in a corresponding increase in the number of 
producers, and of overall PP production (see figure 4). Most of the producers, however, had 
not the technological capability to develop their own process technology, and considered 
outsourcing  as  one  interesting  possibility.  Thus, the  increasing  demand  of polypropylene 
stimulated both the demand of PP production technologies, that were exchanged by means of 
licensing agreements, and the entry of new licensors in the market for technology. In the first 
half of 1980s, the demand of PP technology licenses has grown constantly, especially in 
Europe and the US, but suddenly it expanded in other regions, Far East and Japan included –
e.g., Himont has been the major technology licensor in China, where it provided the process 
technology to more than 17 PP plants.16
Figure 3 – World demand for major plastics (1985-2000)
Source: http://www.montell.com
Figure 4 – World production of polypropylene (millions of lb)
Note: data include Canada from 1995. Source: C&EN (1996, 1997, 1998)
Hence,  one  of  the  consequences  of  the  increase  in  PP  demand,  was  the  increase  of 
competition in the market for technology. Although Himont remained for long the leading 
technology supplier, the number of competitors constantly increased during the 1980s and 
1990s (table 6). Probably in that period, Himont’s technology had the highest performance 
and characteristics, but other new technologies were rapidly emerging. Union Carbide and 
BASF, for example, became aggressive Himont’s competitors in the PP business.
This situation appears to be consistent with Arora and Fosfuri’s theoretical model, by which 
licensing  becomes  the  optimal  strategy  when  the  supplier  is  not  a  monopolist  in  the 
downstream product market, or even when the company is a monopolist in the product market 
but it is in the presence of a potential technology licensor (Arora and Fosfuri, 1999). The 
revenue effect given by licensing is greater in this case than the rent dissipation effect given 
by  the  increased  competition  from  the  additional  licensee.  In  the  view  of  Himont’s 
management,  the  possibility  of  creating  additional  competitors  in  the  PP  market  was 
perceived  indeed  as  a threat. As exposed above, Himont was primarily a manufacturing 
company whose largest share of turnover came from selling polypropylene. In this sense, a 
product unit sold directly to the final market was obviously more convenient than a share of 
licensee’s earnings. However, in the presence of other potential licensors – such as Carbide, 
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due  to  increased  competition  in  the  final  market,  because  new  producers  would  have 
eventually entered by using technologies of Himont’s competitors. The presence of a potential 
licensor (Shell, BASF, Carbide, etc.) created incentives to license because the other licensor 
would have licensed in any case. In this situation, licensing represented on the contrary the 
possibility of capturing additional value from R&D investments.
Table 6 – Major PP technology suppliers by number of plants operated (1980-1997)
Rank Licensor N. of plants
1 Himont 64
2 Union Carbide 32
3 Shell 26
4 BASF 25





10 Mitsubishi Petrochemical 8
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998.
By licensing, however, Himont was able to assure two further ways of gaining profits. The 
first is related to the linkages with the Montedison industrial group. As will be better explored 
in the next sections, the purchase of a technology license ended up with the deliver of the 
projects, the technical notes and all the relevant information to be used by the engineering 
firm in the plant construction. Then, the licensee had greater flexibility concerning which 
engineering firm to use. However, in most cases, the licensees of Himont’s PP technology 
were using the engineering firm of Montedison group (Tecnimont – see table 7), which had 
acquired expertise and know-how in that technology. This assured the licensee that the plant 
was perfectly operating. At the same time, in order to produce polypropylene, a plant requires 
both the feedstock of propylene, and a specific catalyst which enters in the chemical reaction 
in shares of 2-3%. As in the case of the engineering firm, licensees had no contractual 
obligation  of  acquiring  the  catalyst  from  Himont,  and  were  free  of  asking  to  different 
suppliers. However, Himont’s catalyst was perfectly suited for that technology and assured 
the highest performance, so that most licensees chose Himont for the catalyst supply. Notice 
also that a catalyst is a speciality chemical product, whose price-to-quantity ratio is especially 
high (it costs about $350/kilo at current prices). Hence, the total earnings from a technology 
license were relevantly higher than the licensing fees and royalties, if indirect earnings are 
also included.
Table 7 – Major PP engineering firms by number of plants built (1980-1997)
Rank Engineering Firm N. of plants
1 Tecnimont                                          48
2 Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding                  13
3 Uhde                                               10
4 Fluor Daniel                                       10
5 Lurgi                                              8
6 Foster Wheeler                                     5
7 Technip                                            5
Source: Chem-Intell, 1998.18
Finally,  the  third  element  that  was  key  in  Himont’s  decision  to  license  its  proprietary 
technology  was  the  attempt  to  create  a  technology  standard  in  the  market  of  plastics. 
Although by licensing new competitors in the downstream product market were created, 
usually  the  final  customer  of  PP  was  used  to  acquire  polypropylene  from  two  or  three 
different suppliers – i.e., they used second sources of PP. This was especially true regarding 
the  big  car  producers.  However,  these  customers  certainly  preferred  to  have  different 
suppliers but with very similar materials (PP), in order to assure similar characteristics to end-
products and similar manufacturing possibilities. In this sense, they preferred to buy PP from 
Himont and from Himont’s licensees. Indirectly, the presence of PP suppliers using the same 
technology of Himont, instead of increasing the level of competition in the product market, 
was a way of creating stricter and longer relationships with the final customers. In the short-
term  they  probably  reduced  Himont’s  market  share  in  plastics,  but  allowed  Himont  to 
maintain its (reduced) market share in the long-run. Without the possibility of creating a 
product standard, probably Himont would have been threatened by other suppliers using 
technologies of Himont’s competitors in the market for technology. In this sense, Himont’s 
behaviour is consistent with the predictions of Khazam and Mowery (1993) related to the 
creation of a technology standard in the computer industry.
4.3 Management of technology transfer
The case of Himont also appears to be interesting because of the practices of technology 
transfer that have been used, which represent a typical example of technology transaction in 
chemicals. The definition of price, payment methods, knowledge disclosure, and prospective 
further developments are all elements that have to be considered in a licensing agreement. 
Related to these topics, Himont created an internal group composed of about 15 people with 
the purpose of completing the different steps of the transaction.
Usually Himont did not spend much time and large amount of resources in “marketing” its 
technology.  Any  potential  licensee  was  used  to  ask  conditions  to  two  or  three  different 
suppliers. As mentioned above, Himont’s Spheripol process had the best features compared to 
alternative technologies for PP manufacturing existing at that time, so that usually demand of 
licenses exceeded Himont’s supply capabilities. Once contacted, Himont’s licensing group 
gave some general information related to the technology and the licensing agreement, without 
entering into the very (protected) details of the technology. If the buyer accepted Himont’s 
offer, then the two entered in the definition of contract details, where Himont was used to 
allow a great flexibility in order to satisfy customer’s needs.
One of the details to be defined was the method of payment. Standard licensing contracts 
usually included a fixed amount (down-payment) and a variable quantity as a percentage of 
licensee’s turnover or profits (running royalties). This arrangement clearly represents a partial 
solution to problems of information asymmetry in knowledge, and hence a possible solution 
to Arrow’s information paradox (Arrow, 1962). The proportion between the two elements was 
not fixed.  Some  Himont’s  licensees  (or  licensees  coming  from  some  specific  countries) 
preferred  higher  amounts  of  down-payments  and  lower  running  royalties,  while  others 
preferred the opposite. Typically, however, the first down-payment had to be paid at the 
contract sign, to which other two/three payments followed before the plant was completely 
built and operating – it took about two years. Payments were due at specific milestones: the 19
contract  sign,  the  first  and  the  second  technology  package  disclosure,  and  finally,  the 
completion of plant design. This represented the final step of a licensing contract, by which 
the licensor offered to the licensee its (patented and tacit) technological know-how and a plant 
design to be used by an engineering company in order to build the plant. After the deliver of 
the plant design, the licensing contract was completed and the licensee was free to ask any 
engineering company to build the plant. As discussed above, however, in most cases licensees 
preferred to use the engineering firm related to Montedison (Tecnimont), in order to have the 
highest guarantee of functionality.
The  amount  of  royalties  strictly  depended  upon  the  amount  of  down-payments  that  the 
licensee had previously to pay. In any case, a paid up volume was usually defined, in terms of 
cumulative amount of production. After that amount was reached, the plant was considered 
completely  paid.  As  an  explicative  example,  the  initial  value  of  the  (cumulative) down-
payment was on average of about $10/20 millions, while the royalties were usually defined at 
about 3% of annual turnover. The total price of the plant usually depended upon its size 
(small or large), and its functionality (production of a single polymer, of co-polymer, of 
random co-polymer).
The license price included the use of Himont’s patents. By acquiring the license, the licensee 
acquired  the  right  to  develop  the  technology  as  well,  thus  avoiding  the  risk  of  patent 
infringement. Similarly to the idea of Arora (1995 and 1996), it was the control over the 
codified part of the technology to prevent an opportunistic use of disclosed technological 
know-how. Indeed, the characteristics of the technology (and especially the properties of the 
polymer produced) were such that it was easy for Himont to understand which technology and 
which catalyst had been used, so that Himont could easily discover any patent infringement. 
In turn, this situation lowered the propensity of patent infringements, and the possibility to 
further use Himont’s technological information disclosed before the sign of the contract and 
obtained even if the contract eventually was not signed.
The interesting of license agreements, however, was the fact that in many cases they included 
a term of reciprocal continuous know-how, by which both the licensor and the licensee had to 
provide further technological developments each other. In this sense, any licensing contract 
partly included a co-development agreement. This solution is quite typical in licensing, and is 
known  as  grant-back  (Tidd  et  al., 1997).  Usually,  Himont’s  licensees  invested  in  the 
optimisation and customisation of Himont’s technology, especially when they were using that 
technology for a long time. These developments remained within the same technological 
trajectory of the original technology – they were incremental developments – and it never 
happened that a licensee developed a radical and competing new technology, by improving 
Himont’s Spheripol process. In this sense, licensing agreements never included the risk of 
creating new technological competitors.
While licensing agreements usually included a term of co-development, the case of cross-
licensing was different. In other industries – e.g., electronics and semiconductors (Grindley 
and Teece, 1997) –, cross-licensing is used by firms as an ex-ante solution in order to have 
"freedom-to-manufacture" and "design freedom" by starting from other’s knowledge base. 
Cross-licensing agreements in chemicals were mainly the ex-post result of court trials in the 
case of patent infringements. However, the reasons for cross-licensing was mainly the same, 
with the only difference that in semiconductors today people had more experience, and hence 
they anticipated the possibility of incurring in costly trials and resolved everything ex-ante. 
Indeed, instead of spending time and money in order to fully understand who was violating 20
other’s IP rights, and to assess the amount of corresponding damages, court trials usually 
ended up with a decision of reciprocal patent disclosure and use. Many chemical processes 
developed during the 1980s and 1990s were the direct result of patents developed up to 30 
years before. During the trials, it was hence difficult to correctly reconstruct the whole patent 
family and the related IP rights, so that cross-licensing usually became the easier (and less 
costly) solution. Its purpose, however, was mainly to save time and resources, and not to ease 
the innovative process.
For this reason, Himont did not developed specific competencies and devoted organisational 
resources to the management of cross-licensing. In the case of the electronic industry, largest 
firms have developed specific strategies and related managerial procedures of Intellectual 
Capital Management, which are used in order both to create a patent portfolio valuable in 
cross-licensing agreements, to assess the values of internal and other’s patent portfolio, to 
define the  sectors  in  which  investing  the major  R&D  efforts,  and  to  manage the cross-
licensing transaction (Grindley and Teece, 1997). On the contrary, in the case of chemicals, 
licensing agreements have the main purpose of transferring technological know-how and 
cross-licensing represents only a “defensive” answer to others’ patent infringements. Hence, 
technology managers are mainly involved in maximising the transfer of technology and less 
in maximising the value of cross-licensing agreements. The case of Himont clearly responded 
to this latter view.
4.4 Policy implications: Antitrust
The merger between Himont and Shell was strongly opposed by the European Commission 
and the US Federal Trade Commission because against the antitrust laws. In order to fully 
understand the problem, it is useful to consider two events. First, Himont’s Spheripol and 
Shell-Carbide’s Unipol processes were the two top competing technologies for making PP. 
Almost three-quarters of the world’s PP supply was made by using one or other of these two 
processes (C&IN, 1996). Second, during the long story of the Ziegler-Natta catalysis (starting 
at the end of the 1950s), Himont has strongly protected its technology with patents. Because 
of the importance of the technology, however, it was not improbable and infrequent that 
others were violating Himont’s IP rights (patent infringement), and Himont usually reacted by 
suing them. Instead of spending time and money in trials, in many cases the two parts were 
ending up with an agreement of (partial) patent disclosure and cross-licensing. For example, 
this was the case with Monsanto and Goodyear. As a matter of fact, because of the long 
history of patent infringements and cross-licensing agreements, Himont (Montedison) had 
created a complex network of technological relationships with different companies.
These two situations were extremely important in the view of regulatory authorities. Probably 
for the first time since the definition of antitrust laws, the two authorities were opposing to 
Himont and Shell not for the formation of a monopoly in the plastics market, but in the 
market for plastic technologies – mainly PP and PE. Indeed, because of the network of patent 
linkages that Himont had created with other companies, and the fact that Himont and Shell 
had the leading PP process technologies, the two companies could de facto control the whole 
market for technology and any further technological development. Obviously Union Carbide 
strongly supported the regulatory authorities. With the merge between Himont and Shell, 
Carbide was going to loose its technological partner, and its competencies on catalysts – in 
the partnership Shell-Carbide, the former provided know-how on catalysts, and the latter on 21
the  process  technology.  And this situation was clearly a relevant threat for its licensing 
business.
Hence, the regulatory authorities allowed the formation of the new joint-venture, subject to a
set of conditions (C&IN, 1996). First, The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) forced 
Shell’s US division, Shell Oil, to spin-off its PP businesses, including its share of Unipol, into 
a separate company (temporarily known as Polyco), to be “held separate” from the rest of the 
firm and eventually sold. Montell had no influence over this company. Second, the European 
Commission and FTC ruled that Montell shouldn’t be involved in granting Spheripol licenses 
either.  Montedison  created  another  subsidiary,  called Technipol,  to  handle  the  licensing 
business. Hence Montell had to supply Spheripol – both the know-how and the catalysts – to 
Technipol for a fee. Technipol could sell the licenses and catalysts to its clients, and had to 
pay some of the money back to Montell. Third, Technipol could be integrated back to Montell 
only when Shell Oil sold Polyco, and Carbide was provided with the technological know-how 
needed to become a supplier of the “technology package” – catalysts, process and know-how.
Clearly these conditions were especially stringent to Shell. The objective of the formation of 
Montell with Montedison was to obtain access to Montedison’s Spheripol technology and its 
developments – Montedison was developing the new Catalloy technology at that moment. 
But with Technipol left outside the new company, Montell brought no value to Shell. Thus, 
Shell tried to satisfy rapidly the conditions posed by the two regulatory agencies. Montedison 
was particularly interested in the new joint-venture as well. Nevertheless, contrarily to Shell, 
the temporary solution imposed by the authorities was not too costly to Montedison, which 
could continue licensing out its technologies and earn profits. Rather, because of the financial 
situation in which it was at that time (which represented the main reason for the creation of 
the new venture), Montedison licensed aggressively during that period. Indeed, the regulatory 
authorities required Technipol to complete a periodic report of the activities, and it was 
particularly easy to demonstrate that the licensing business was not interrupted waiting for the 
conditions to be satisfied.
As a matter of fact, no more than two years later the antitrust decision, all the conditions were 
satisfied,  and  Montell  could  operate completely. Union Carbide obtained access to Shell 
technology and became an important competitor to Montell, although Montell remained the 
leading PP supplier and producer (see figure 2). In the meanwhile, new technologies for the 
production  of  PP  were  emerging  (i.e.,  the metallocene  technology),  and  new  important 
suppliers  entered  the  market  for  technology  (e.g.  BP,  Exxon,  Mitsui),  hence  contrasting 
Montell and Carbide leadership positions. To be sure, the “old” stereospecific technologies –
i.e. Sheripol, Unipol, and Catalloy – remained important especially in the emerging countries 
of  Far  East,  where  downstream  manufacturing  companies  did  not  need  the  enhanced 
properties of polypropylene obtained with the new technologies.
10 In sum, the regulatory 
authorities’ intervention has been probably less severe than expected, because the emergence 
of  new  technological  trajectories  would  have  eventually  broken  the  Shell-Montedison 
monopoly in the market for technology, by allowing new actors to enter, and by increasing 
the  level  of competition.  The  authorities’  decisions  have  only  anticipated  the  results  of 
technological progress.
11
                                                
10 In this sense, Himont’s licensing activity at that time was mainly consistent with the traditional theoretical 
view of leaders licensing the “old” technologies in order to earn the further, additional value from R&D 
investments.
11 This story suggests that sometimes there is excessive policy preoccupations when markets can in fact solve the 
problem. A similar story can be found in the case of patent protection (Mergers and Nelson, 1994).22
5. Conclusions
Technology transfer through licensing agreements has been a common feature of the chemical 
industry since the development of petrochemicals in the 1950s. The worldwide increasing 
demand of chemical products at that time, and the strong science base of the industry due to 
developments in chemical engineering and chemical science (i.e. polymer chemistry), were 
the major forces that allowed a division of labour at the industry level between specialised 
technology  suppliers  (SEFs)  and  downstream  chemical  companies.  Technology  exchange 
between the two was mainly conducted by means of licensing agreements.
The case of Himont can be placed in this framework of international transfer of chemical 
process technologies. To be sure, however, Himont was not exactly a specialised engineering 
company. Its main business was selling plastic products (mainly polypropylene – PP), and it 
was only for some “historical accidents” that it started to license out its proprietary (and in 
some sense revolutionary) process technology for PP manufacturing. Although motivated by 
historical internal reasons, Himont’s licensing behaviour was subject to the same conditions 
that induced many chemical companies to enter the market for process technology – typically 
operated  only  by  the  SEFs  –  and  offer  their  technological  know-how.  It  is  commonly 
recognised that it was the presence of SEFs that, by creating new competitors in the product 
market and hence increasing the rent dissipation effect, induced large chemical companies to 
license out their technologies, in order to increase the revenue effect coming from technology 
licensing (Arora and Fosfuri, 1999). As a matter of fact, large chemical firms are the second 
largest technology suppliers after SEFs.
The characteristics of the knowledge base in chemicals eased the process of codification. In 
turn, the high degree of codification lowered the costs of technology transfer, because it 
required fewer face-to-face interactions necessary to transfer tacit know-how, and allowed 
technology  suppliers  to  reach  larger  markets –  i.e.  a  higher  number  of  customers.  This 
situation strongly influenced firms’ strategies for technology exploitation. Instead of long and 
costly  face-to-face  interactions,  which  are  usually  required  in  other  industries  (e.g., 
machinery) and which sometimes end up with the transfer of technicians and engineers, the 
higher  codification  of  technological  knowledge  make  it  easier  to  transfer  technology  by 
means of market-based interactions (such as licensing agreements).
If this picture characterises the chemical industry in general, the case of Himont appears 
particularly relevant because it represents a clear example of determinants and implications of 
technology licensing. Himont’s decision to start and continue licensing its new Spheripol
process technology provided a partial verification of various theories related to technology 
licensing. The role of downstream complementary assets in production, the role of existing 
and competing technology suppliers, the role of competition both in the technology and in the 
product market, the role of market demand, and the role of technology standards were all 
elements that entered into play, and that were important in shaping Himont’s strategy. In this 
sense, Himont seemed to behave according to theory’s predictions. However, while some of 
them acted as sparking condition – see, for instance, the lack of complementary assets in 
production – the other acted as reinforcing mechanisms which made profitable to Himont to 
keep on licensing. Among these, the presence of existing technology suppliers creating new 
competitors in the product market is probably the most important. And this might suggest that 
markets for technology once developed create endogenous growing mechanisms. 23
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